Ukraine’s top general describes their counter-offensive as a stalemate. They need innovation, by which he means more advanced American weapons. This against an American Congress that is growing in opposition as the election campaigns intensify and the crisis in the Middle East continues to develop. Ukraine receives (second generation) ATACMS, F-16 aircraft and Leopard tanks. Germany has pledged 7 billion euros more in military aid. However, France’s Macron is not the only one talking about the inevitability of ‘fair and good’ negotiations. What power would Ukraine now have in negotiations? The reality is that all leverage starts with gains on the battlefield. It was always an extreme challenge to face a three-line defense, with little air cover. Experts now routinely admit what few dared a year ago: Western weapons have been enough for Ukraine to neither lose nor gain.
Why? At least in part, concerns about nuclear escalation. Ukraine could use advanced weapons to attack Russia more heavily. An ‘irresponsible use’. Or use them responsibly and effectively to achieve surprising gains for Ukraine – especially Crimea – at the risk of unthinkable escalation. Experts admit this less routinely, while accepting the given nuclear shadow shapes. Jake Sullivan recently went further. For him, the loss of Crimea is Putin’s nuclear redline, which became a reality when strikes forced Russia to move part of its fleet to Novorossiysk.
Putin’s use of nuclear weapons, even if desperate and merely a low-yield “demonstration,” is both unthinkable and unlikely. Only his Chinese ‘ally’ would disown it, and probably Putin too. Why such fear about something with so little risk? The obvious answer is major consequences, even if it is a warning shot. It breaks the nuclear taboo. War games lead to horror scenarios when the West’s response is too strong. When it is weak and divided, the value of nuclear weapons increases along with the value of their proliferation. Then there’s Belarus: will firing nuclear warheads from there automatically increase the war?
Regardless of the probability, the threat is credible. Experts debate whether using tactical nuclear weapons first, ‘escalating to de-escalate’ to stop a war, is Russian military doctrine. Regardless, non-strategic warheads are integrated over land, sea and air. The order can be executed. They have local and national RT media control that does not report or fabricate civilian attacks. RT also seems to be preparing their audience for nuclear use (unsuccessfully so far). Virtual nuclear tests and Armageddon threats to Britain extend the horror thoughts to Western peoples. Their police state arrests leaders of ‘not in my name’ protests, which lenient courts sentence. This deepens their “atrocity power,” a license that extends to public nuclear threats. The US pointed out to him the ‘catastrophic consequences’ of the use of nuclear weapons. In private.
Graham Allison argues that the West has no policy to deter or respond to Russian nuclear use, or the threat thereof. Among the few to suggest this is Jeffrey Edmonds, former director of NSA Russia. The first two of the four options are do nothing or go nuclear. Both unscrupulous. The third, continued unflinching support for Ukraine, may be too business as usual. The fourth, Western conventional attacks on Russian assets, could only fuel Putin’s “war on the West” narrative. Especially useful if you lose, perhaps giving license for further escalation. Is there a fifth option? Deterrence is an implicit negotiation, but one that offers what the other side least wants. Ideally, you also offer what you want most – it increases credibility, as you may have to do so.
What would Putin want least and offer the West most? At the very least, he would want a unified, progressive commitment to more funding. A joint promise of, for example, 40 billion dollars. Enough to consolidate gains, provide more battlefield defeats, and at the same time contain the war against Ukraine and Ukrainians. At the very least, Putin’s outcome could result in direct war with the West.
A pledge publicly addresses the strength of Putin’s threats. His media, the military and the elites will see that he has chosen this. Will war criticism increase, even on RT, now that unrest is on a scale difficult to allay? Will his chain of command decide the existential war of this war for him alone? He will be weaker. This mechanism reduces the strength of the nuclear threat by answering it in advance. The background buzz has had consequences for responsible decision makers. A promise moves the buzz to the foreground and amplifies it to reduce the noise. A military and moral red line and template for future nuclear theaters. It is an insurance that guarantees nuclear use. Payment only when the event takes place. Unlike insurance, the policy can only reduce the probability of the event. This ‘deterrence fund’ can deter escalation, contain it, discourage proliferation and support negotiations: sellable to hawks and doves.
The US can lead or monitor the commitments for this emergency fund, while influencing private negotiations. American presidents don’t like to be painted into corners. She can paint this from one. It still leaves all other options on the table, especially if the use of nuclear energy is more blatant. Western countries that formally agree on their commitments through law will anchor unity. If passed through the legislature, it will demonstrate the power of democracies. Laws are harder to implement, but also harder to repeal. Also for future American presidents, and especially if public opinion supports this.
Experts are increasingly calling for a new strategy: to contain and pressure Russia. This accepts that recapturing large areas of land and regime change are unlikely. The number of casualties can decrease and the money can be better spent on weapons with a longer range (e.g. Taurus). The promise makes this possible. Why now? Support is at a crossroads as Putin waits for Trump. This ‘free’ initiative adds to the case for more advanced support, while containing escalation as Gaza continues to unfold. The promise and the weapons could change Putin’s calculations and expectations. Not when you’re cornered, but now too.
Neither Putin nor Zelensky currently have the will – or political space – to make concessions for real negotiations. Both are not ‘ripe’. This containment strategy, if fully supported, could change the future of both sides. This may accelerate this maturity and save lives. This strategy requires weapons with longer range, and thus the reduction of the nuclear shadow (regardless of its improbability). The ‘deterrence fund’ can support this, while containing the escalation to Ukraine in advance. A public, pre-negotiated show of unity that even a re-elected Trump could not easily undo.
We cannot afford to lose Ukraine or lose peace. They need a credible alternative to a bad deal, to walk away and continue to fight more effectively at a lower cost. A new mechanism that could give them leverage for a settlement that can be truly fair and good.
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