But the police represent only one aspect of this revenue-generating system. Judges and their courts also use traffic citations to generate money for the cities that employ them.
As public finance scholars, we study how cities raise money to pay for their operations. Our new research indicates that judges in cities facing red ink often use their positions to maximize revenue from traffic fines. They can do this by adding financial penalties to unpaid tickets. Judges often use the extra sentences to encourage people to pay.
However, the process of generating dollars through traffic tickets starts with the police.
Revenue-based policing
Traffic violations are common. Whether drivers fail to signal a turn or drive a few miles per hour over the speed limit, it is not difficult for police to find someone who has violated a traffic law. Officers can decide when to issue a ticket and can adjust the number of tickets they issue based on factors unrelated to whether someone has broken the law.
These factors include the race of the driver or the racial makeup of the neighborhood the officers patrol. Typically, this means that African American drivers and drivers in neighborhoods with more African American residents receive higher rates than other people.
Another factor that affects ticket sales, but has nothing to do with whether motorists break traffic laws, is the city’s budgetary situation.
A high-profile example of how the use of traffic tickets in a city can be a problem is Ferguson, Missouri. According to a 2015 Department of Justice report, “Ferguson’s law enforcement practices are shaped by the city’s focus on revenue rather than the needs of public safety.” And these practices disproportionately affected African Americans. According to that report, African Americans made up 67% of the city’s population at the time, but were the subject of 85% of traffic stops, 90% of tickets, 92% of citations issued by police, and 96% of arrests. .
Ferguson was not the first nor the only local government to supplement its coffers with traffic fines. In the years since that federal report, numerous studies have shown that police and other city personnel increase the number of traffic tickets they issue based on budget needs.
The practice is so widespread that it has several names, including “for-profit policing” and “revenue-motivated policing.”
After a police officer tickets a driver, the process goes to court.
Ticket incentives in court
In some cases, the court that handles traffic fines is run by the state; in other cases it is managed by the municipality. Either way, the court is responsible for collecting money from traffic tickets.
But which court hears the case makes quite a difference. When a traffic ticket is settled in state court, the money from the fees is divided between the state and the various local governments. But if that same ticket is settled in municipal court, the vast majority of the money goes to the city.
Our research examined how this difference affected traffic fines in Indiana. Similar to previous research, we found that police in cities facing revenue shortfalls issued more tickets. But we showed that this only happened when cities had their own municipal courts. In other words, police will only issue more tickets if it is profitable for the cities they serve.
We also explored how judges use their power to raise more money.
Ferguson provides yet another example of how authorities can abuse this power. As outlined in the Justice Department report, judges did not take into account an individual’s financial status when imposing fines or setting payment terms. They also aggressively applied optional fees for late payments. Finally, judges and police officers provided incorrect or incomplete information about when and whether suspects should appear in court. That meant defendants were often charged additional fees – and sometimes arrest warrants – for failing to appear.
Our research examined whether the problems in Ferguson were happening elsewhere. We studied Indiana, where judges can revoke defendants’ driver’s licenses if they haven’t paid their fines. This is a powerful, but potentially harmful way to enforce payment. We counted the number of days judges waited before revoking a driver’s license. We then looked at whether the city was experiencing a revenue shortfall. We found that judges are more likely to suspend permits when their cities need more money. The effect was quite significant: a 1% drop in sales caused licenses to be suspended three days faster.
Indiana’s property tax system sets limits on the amount of revenue cities can collect through property taxes, and cities only discover how much of their property taxes they can collect after the city budget process is complete. This system allowed us to compare cities with different levels of revenue shortfalls due to state-mandated cuts in property tax revenues.
it comes down to
In some cities and states, officials operate their courts — not just police departments — to generate revenue. We believe that this is inherently a problem. The criminal justice system should exist to maximize public safety, not to increase revenue.
But if states change the rules about who keeps the money generated by traffic tickets and related fines, revenue maximization incentives disappear.
Our research confirms this. Judges will have no incentive to suspend permits more quickly if their cities face a budget crisis if revenues go to the state.
This change won’t solve everything. Racial bias in the criminal justice system will still be pervasive. But it could help move away from policing – and judging – for profit.
Sian Mughan is Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, Arizona State University and Akheil Singla is Assistant Professor at the School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.