Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran were announced as new permanent members of the BRICS. The announcement was accompanied by a promise to define criteria for future new memberships. The expansion negotiations faced significant pressure from the Chinese, who advocated a wider opening and encouraged the candidacy of dozens of countries. Brazil and India, on the other hand, resisted this move and, together with South Africa, negotiated for a more assertive position from Russia and China in favor of broader reform of the UN, especially within the Security Council. However, this expansion leads to uncertainties about the future of the BRICS.
Twelve years after the first expansion with South Africa, and six years after the Chinese idea of expansion in 2017, which gained momentum in the past year, 2022, maintained the decision to integrate six new members, each with different characteristics, the operational logic of the group. : it depends on its members’ perception of the international situation, maintains independence for individual strategies and initiatives, and makes no effort to institutionalize the group.
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have worked over the years to establish common positions on key issues on the international agenda through consensus. This includes a demand for more representative financial governance, which is a direct criticism of the quota and voting structure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Amid the 2014 Crimea crisis and the recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine, these countries advocated a resolution of the conflict through dialogue and did not support proposals for sanctions against the Russians. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the lack of uncoordinated actions, which many see as a strategic mistake, they have used their bank, the New Development Bank (NDB), to provide emergency credit lines to address the impact of the health crisis to grab.
The NDB is the prime example of the reach and vitality of the BRICS group, reflecting their dissatisfaction with global financial governance without competing with it. In an effort to supplement existing credit lines, the NDB approved 123 projects between 2016 and 2022, mobilizing more than $30 billion. The country has a credit rating of AA+, largely thanks to China’s rating, but despite championing agility in project analysis, the same cannot be said for mobilizing resources. The concerted effort to establish the bank contrasts with the parallel strategies and initiatives adopted by its members in recent years. China stands out in this regard, having promoted the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), all with different objectives than BRICS. Why not explore the potential of the BRICS? The Chinese view the consensus structure as a constraint, and the BRICS structure itself does not impose any restrictions on the individual actions of its members. Therefore, it is logical and expected that countries will seek different strategies to defend their interests, as China has done.
The absence of a structure of constraints and limitations has ensured the resilience of the BRICS. The group’s low or non-existent industrialization ensures that its members can only reach consensus on common agendas. Moreover, it ensures that its coordination takes place without the impression of high costs for its maintenance over time. BRICS relies solely on the will of its members to hold regular consultations, without depending on any formal structure, such as a headquarters or bureaucracy. BRICS is anchored in annual summits and their declarations. These declarations are the only formal and official documents of the coordination. On the other hand, the absence of rules, norms and procedures poses a challenge to the BRICS at times such as its expansion. How can one analyze and justify the selection of six new members without a formal framework to guide the decision? The choice of some over others could create diplomatic constraints for the BRICS, both individually and collectively, despite the strong interest shown in recent months. Above all, it reinforces the criticism of the image and representation that BRICS has built up since its founding.
BRICS is recognized for bringing together emerging economies that are politically, economically and socially very different. It includes two of the world’s five largest economies: China and India. It strives, even with limited coherence, to be a voice for developing countries. Its expansion, justified at the end of the 15th Summit in Johannesburg on August 24, was deemed necessary to adapt the group to the contemporary international situation, giving the group greater diversity and representation. With this announcement, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East are better represented within the group.
The entry of Argentina, Egypt and Ethiopia into the BRICS, as agreed by its members, strengthens Latin American and African positions within the BRICS group. Argentina was one of the first countries to officially present its candidacy for the BRICS in 2022. The country believes that the association with the group will strengthen its image and contribute to the recovery of its economy. Argentina has also expressed interest in joining the New Development Bank (NDB). Meanwhile, Egypt and Ethiopia are criticizing Africa’s representation within the group, including concerns about South Africa’s de facto leadership. Ethiopia’s accession was facilitated by its role as headquarters of the African Union (AU), which had been explored since 2013 at the Durban Summit as an important means of strengthening relations between BRICS members and the continent. Egypt, Africa’s second-largest economy after Nigeria, joined the NDB in 2023, shortly after the United Arab Emirates, which became a new member of the BRICS in 2021.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the accession of Saudi Arabia and Iran poses a series of challenges for BRICS, both politically and economically. Politically, both are non-democratic countries, with Saudi Arabia being a monarchy and Iran being a theocratic republic with a lifelong religious leader as head of state. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which enjoys relative sympathy from the West, Iran’s diplomatic ties with the United States have been severed for decades and sanctions are regularly imposed on the country. Economically, both countries are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with Saudi Arabia being the largest member and the largest economy in the Middle East. This adds a new dimension of influence to the BRICS, amid increasingly fierce competition for access to energy resources.
Indeed, the entry of these new members into the BRICS raises the argument that the BRICS represents a counterpoint to the G7 and the liberal international order. However, the Brazilian authorities in particular have been keen to deny this idea. Brazilian President Lula da Silva and his Economy Minister Fernando Haddad were clear when they stated that it is not the intention of the BRICS to oppose the G-7, the G-20 or the United States. According to them, the BRICS and its expansion reflect a shared interest among its members in organizing the Global South and advocating important agendas for developing countries. They call for reforms in international organizations to ensure that they reflect the current distribution of power and recognize the importance of countries like the BRICS in global politics and the economy.
The subtle but clear shift in the BRICS position on the United Nations Security Council (UN Security Council) indicates that negotiations on its expansion have been intense and have yielded gains, at least in terms of rhetoric, especially for Brazil and India . The Summit Declaration explicitly calls for one
more democratic, representative, effective and efficient, and to increase the representation of developing countries in the membership of the Council […] including Brazil, India and South Africa, to play a greater role in international affairs, especially in the United Nations, including the Security Council
China, the main proponent of the expansion idea, and Russia, which was looking for a broader BRICS capable of building and strengthening bridges in the face of Western sanctions, had to be flexible in their positions on this historical demand from their partners. Whether this will be realized remains to be seen, but it marks a fundamental change in position.
The expansion does not resolve a series of uncertainties about the future of the BRICS; it actually strengthens them. While on the one hand it strengthens the recognition and weight of the BRICS in international politics, on the other hand it challenges the group in terms of cohesion and industrialization. Will the country be able to translate its political weight into concrete actions? Will this be seen as a counterpoint to the G7? How will it admit new members? Under what criteria? Will it remain an informal group or will it adopt rules and norms? These are just some of the many questions that the market and academia will delve deeper into from now on.
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